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INTRODUCTION 
Jonathan A. Franklin† 
I. FRAMING THE ISSUES: THE UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION ON THE 
RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 
The year 2012 marks the fifth anniversary of the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (“UNDRIP”).1 The UN 
General Assembly adopted the declaration on September 13, 2007 after 
decades of negotiation.2  The UNDRIP’s completion and broad ratification 
was a notable achievement: it enshrined the collective and individual rights 
of indigenous peoples in addition to declaring their right to self-
determination.   
A procedural cornerstone of the UNDRIP is the requirement that 
relevant indigenous peoples give their “free, prior, and informed consent”3 
regarding changes that will affect their physical and spiritual environment.4  
This standard is far broader than what would be recognized in the Western 
legal tradition, which has historically created separate bodies of law for the 
environment, religion, and property.  In contrast, many indigenous peoples 
have articulated a broader understanding in communal stewardship over land 
and an interconnection between spirituality and land.5  
This can be seen in relation to the story of Ayahuasca, a traditional 
medicine from the Amazon basin.  It is used by indigenous peoples there as a 
treatment for a variety of conditions and in spiritual rituals.  As such, its use 
combines medicinal and spiritual qualities in a single plant.  In 1981, 
International Plant Medicine Corporation patented Ayahuasca in the United 
States based on a sample one of its employees bought back from a trip to 
                                                      
† Associate Law Librarian, Univ. of Washington School of Law, Marian Gould Gallagher Law 
Library.  The author would like to thank David Cromwell for his patience and good nature, Louise Franklin 
for her substantive insights and the MacArthur Foundation and the American Library Association for their 
support through the Library Copyright Alliance. 
1  Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A., Res, 61/295, U,N, Doc, A/RES/61/295 
(Sept. 13, 2007) [hereinafter U.N. Declaration], available at http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/ 
documents/DRIPS_en.pdf.   
2  U.N. Declaration, supra note 1. 
3  Article 19 of the Declaration is particularly important for protecting the indigenous worldview.  
See U.N. Declaration art. 19 (“States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples 
concerned through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free, prior and informed 
consent before adopting and implementing legislative or administrative measures that may affect them.”). 
4 U.N. Declaration art. 11(2), 19 
5 JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 141 (Oxford Univ. Press, 2004).  
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South America. 6   The patenting of Ayahuasca symbolizes the tension 
between what indigenous peoples see as bio-piracy and foreign companies 
term bio-prospecting.  Removing a single plant sample would not appear to 
affect the physical or spiritual environment in the Western tradition and so 
would not require consent.  However, for many indigenous peoples, 
removing a plant can and does have spiritual, in addition to economic, 
implications.  The UN designed the “free, prior and informed consent” 
requirement of the UNDRIP to protect such interests of indigenous peoples. 
It is, of course, important to acknowledge indigenous peoples hold a 
wide variety of beliefs and pursue varied goals when engaging in this 
discussion.  These goals are further altered by their relationship with the 
state(s) within which they live.  For example, the Australian Aborigines have 
no historical basis for formal legal negotiations with Australian government 
bodies until recently,7 while the Maori of New Zealand have had the Treaty 
of Waitangi since 1840, which formalized the relationship between the 
Maori and the British.8  
Indigenous peoples do not unanimously favor the UNDRIP.  Notably, 
some indigenous peoples are concerned that reliance on the Declaration 
implies acceptance of the member-state based United Nations as a 
lawmaking body.  Indigenous peoples argue that because their communities 
existed before these states, they should not need to rely on international law 
to validate their rights.9  In addition, since the policies of member states are 
dependent on the government in power, a state’s interest in adhering to the 
UNDRIP can increase or decrease suddenly, as administrations change.  This 
limits the ability of indigenous peoples to rely on consistent enforcement of 
indigenous rights protected by the UNDRIP. 
 Some member states are also concerned with the UNDRIP due to the 
language it contains.  Specifically, states are concerned with the 
Declaration’s enforceability.10  While it was clearly negotiated and ratified as 
                                                      
6  Leanne M. Fecteau, The Ayahuasca Patent Revocation: Raising Questions About Current U.S. 
Patent Policy, 21 B.C. THIRD WORLD L. J. 69-104 (2001).  For another example, see Jamie Mayer & 
Ragavan Srividhya, Has India Addressed Its Farmers' Woes? A Story of Plant Protection Issues, 20 GEO. 
INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 97-127 (2007). 
7  Mabo v. Queensland (No. 2) (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1 (Austl.). 
8  Treaty of Waitangi, [1840] (Austl.). 
9  JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 6 (2004). 
10  Australian Human Rights Commission, Questions and answers on the UN Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous People, April 2009, available at http://humanrights.gov.au/social_justice/ 
declaration/declaration_QA_2009.html; US Department of State, UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples Review, http://www.state.gov/s/tribalconsultation/declaration/ 
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soft law,11 future courts or other bodies could use it as the basis for creating 
hard law in the future.  Because it is considered soft law, some states choose 
to acknowledge the UNDRIP without adhering to it.  In so doing, they often 
frame it as an “aspirational” document that provides minimum standards, 
rather than maximalist goals.  At the same time, some member states 
consider those standards to be impractically high and worry about the 
challenges attendant to meeting them.12  
In addition to indigenous peoples and member states, numerous 
authors have addressed the complicated issues surrounding the rights of 
indigenous peoples in international, domestic, and customary law.  Domestic 
laws directly affecting indigenous peoples are often in direct conflict with 
internationally recognized rights.13  In such cases, some indigenous peoples 
have resorted to non-legal remedies, such as starting media campaigns or 
engaging in protests.  The UNDRIP sets out a method for dealing with the 
tension between the indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination and the 
economic interests of member states through the requirement that indigenous 
peoples give “free, prior and informed consent” before a state intrudes upon 
their land.  Unfortunately, there are far too many instances when this does 
not occur, particularly in the context of unilateral agreements between states 
and third parties regarding the extraction of natural resources from their 
lands. 
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE ARTICLES 
The four articles in this issue all contribute to the dialogue 
surrounding the intersection of indigenous people’s rights within 
international law and domestic actions that conflict with those rights.  While 
the UNDRIP and other international law instruments are explicit about how 
states should act towards indigenous populations, in many cases these 
international instruments conflict with domestic law.  There are several 
reasons for this discrepancy, including states’ self-interest, paternalism, and 
lack of resources needed to address both national concerns and the rights of 
indigenous peoples. 
                                                      
11  Andrew T. Guzman & Timothy L. Meyer, International Soft Law, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 171, 
(2010) (“soft law is most commonly defined to include hortatory, rather than legally binding, 
obligations.”). 
12  Four countries initially voted against the Declaration: Australia, New Zealand, the United States, 
and Canada.  Although all four have more recently supported it, all four countries have substantial 
indigenous populations and continue to be concerned about the fallout from demands for self-determination 
commercial redress. 
13  See, e.g., Megan Davis, Indigenous Struggles in Standard-Setting: The United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 9 MELB. J. INT'L L. 439, 469 (2008). 
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 Anna Cowan’s article addresses the challenge to indigenous people’s 
right of self-determination posed by Australian state action.  She analyzes 
the context and issues surrounding the Northern Territories National 
Emergency Response, commonly called the Intervention, in which the 
Australian Government responded to concerns of child abuse among the 
Aborigines of the Northern Territories by implementing a broad array of 
intrusive programs without prior consultation, let alone consent.  Facets of 
the Intervention were in direct contravention of the UNDRIP, including 
suspension of Australia’s Racial Discrimination Act.  Because this 
suspension removed protections preventing discrimination against the 
Aborigines in the context of the Intervention, it drew the ire of a wide array 
of groups.  The article raises the important question of what states can do 
within the intent of the Declaration to address an issue specific to a racially 
distinct group, assuming some action is justified.  A stated objective of the 
Intervention was “to reduce the amount of money finding its way towards 
alcohol and drugs in indigenous communities during the emergency 
period.”14  It is then relevant to ask what methods are acceptable, if any, and 
how a government should proceed under the UNDRIP while remaining 
responsive to the situation. 
The Intervention poses particular challenges in both the policymaking 
process it represents and its substance.  For example, how can a state respect 
the  right of participation, defined as “no decision directly relating to their 
rights and interests and taken without their informed consent” under 
UNDRIP Article 19,15 in the context of state action without abrogating its 
responsibilities to its citizens?  The word “consent” is quite strong, which is 
a cause of conern for some states.  This is one of the important reasons that 
state actors tend to use the word “aspirational” when describing the 
UNDRIP and the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, ILO 169.16. 
While Cowan discusses participation, non-discrimination, and self-
determination in the context of state action, Jacinta Ruru addresses those 
                                                      
14 Anna Cowan, UNDRIP and the Intervention: Indigenous Self-Determination, Participation, and 
Racial Discrimination in the Northern Territory of Australia, 22 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 247 (2013).   
15 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples United Nations Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples art. 19, G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007) 
[hereinafter UNDRIP], available at http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf 
16  Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention 1989 (entered into force Sept. 5, 1991); Indigenous and 
Tribal Peoples Convention, International Labor Organization (“ILO”), Convention No. 169 (1989), 
available at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C169.  This 
is an international legally binding document supporting indigenous rights.  However, it is only legally 
binding for the states that ratify it.  Few major countries outside South America have ratified ILO 169.  See 
ILO, Ratifications of C169, available at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:11300: 
0::NO:11300:P11300_INSTRUMENT_ID:312314:NO.   
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same issues in the context of ownership of a natural resource: water.  She 
brings a sharp focus to New Zealand’s allocation of water from natural 
bodies that have spiritual and economic value to indigenous peoples. 
Maori have a holistic worldview that finds life force, mauri, in many 
things and places, including rivers.  Due to this cosmovision, Maori law 
finds “it is abhorrent to mix waters with waters of another catchment and to 
mix waters with human sewage.”17  Since Article 25 of the UNDRIP states 
that “[i]ndigenous people have the right to maintain and strengthen their 
distinctive spiritual relationship with their traditionally owned or otherwise 
occupied and used lands, territories, water, and coastal seas,” 18  the 
combination of the UNDRIP and the Treaty of Waitangi give the Maori a 
strong ground for involvement in water allocation issues.  The Aotearoa 
New Zealand government has addressed the issue by arguing  in front of the 
Waitangi Tribunal that the water and the river it comes from belong to no 
one.  On one level, this facilitates co-management of resources, because it 
removes ownership as a possibility.  On another level, it disenfranchises 
those who seek redress for the water and river they once owned. 
Ruru goes on to explore three different ways the State has addressed 
the Maori desire for redress in cases of water allocation: acknowledging 
ownership of a lakebed without ownership of the water or air above, 
permitting co-management of the river system, and considering the river to 
be an independent legal entity, appointing a guardian for it.  Ruru analyzes 
each of these approaches in-depth, with a central observation that they 
permit cultural redress in that all three are designed to preserve the spiritual 
importance of the water source, rather than its economic value.  She then 
goes on to address the much thornier water issue of how the state addresses 
the desire for commercial redress.  In this context, Ruru poses one of the 
hardest questions: can there be reconciliation without commercial redress?  
If not, is reconciliation doomed?  If so, what is a path forward that gets 
beyond apologies and minor concessions framed as cultural redress? 
Elizabeth Salmón addresses the relationship between indigenous 
peoples and the Peruvian state.  She examines instances of social conflict 
when a state permits natural resource use and indigenous peoples are not 
consulted.  In response to indigenous social protests, the Peruvian 
government took steps to “redress historical injustices of indigenous peoples 
and to pacify the social demonstrations.”19  Although international human 
                                                      
17 Cowan, supra note 14.   
18 UNDRIP art. 25.   
19 Elizabeth Salmón G., The Struggle for Laws of Free, Prior, and Informed Consultation in Peru: 
Lessons and Ambiguities in the Recognition of Indigenous Peoples, 22 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J 353 (2013).   
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rights instruments require consultation with indigenous peoples, at a 
minimum, this has not been a priority for Peru. 20   In the balancing of 
interests, the administration determined economic development took priority 
over free, prior, and informed consultation of indigenous peoples.  After an 
uprising in Bagua related to the government’s decision to move forward with 
the project, the Peruvian government suspended and abolished certain 
decrees and entered into discussions with the indigenous peoples of the area.  
After the consultations, the government continued to prioritize economic 
development over the wishes of indigenous peoples, raising the question of 
whether consultation should mean more than holding a discussion, such as 
requiring an agreed understanding between the parties, arriving at a mutually 
acceptable plan for future action. 
Although violence continued following the Peruvian adoption of a 
free, prior, and informed consultation law, Salmón convincingly argues that 
the law has had beneficial long-term effects.  These include esatablishment 
of requirements that government ministries consult with relevant indigenous 
peoples, as well as the development of a database of contacts for indigenous 
peoples.  In the meantime, there has been national debate about whether 
indigenous peoples affected by a hydroelectric dam have to consent to the 
dam or merely be consulted.  Even with the benefits of the law, it remains to 
be seen whether social protests will diminish if consultations increase. 
Unlike the other articles, which address land and real property issues, 
Michael Blakeney addresses the rights of indigenous peoples in spiritual 
expressions in Australia.  His central concern is whether there is a way to 
prevent the misuse by non-indigenous peoples of spiritual images, songs, 
and other cultural expressions.  Examples of misuse include derogatory 
cartoons, perpetuation of false stereotypes, and depictions of sacred imagery 
out of context.  He investigates several alternatives, including the intellectual 
property system.  Unlike most jurisdictions, Australia has a substantial body 
of jurisprudence addressing the nexus of indigenous peoples’ expressions 
and intellectual property law.  These cases often address instances of misuse, 
characterized as “unauthorized and derogatory treatment of works that 
embody community images or knowledge.”21  Some of the challenges of 
legislating in this area include conflicts with policies favoring free speech as 
well as whether, if protected by the intellectual property system, such 
expressions would ever become part of the public domain. 
                                                      
20  Id. at § II.A.4.   
21 Michael Blakeney, Protecting the Spiritual Beliefs of Indigenous People –Australian Case Studies, 
22 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 391 (2013).   
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One of the most interesting aspects of Blakeney’s article is how he 
traces the jurisprudential approach of these intellectual property cases back 
to disputes that deal with the Native Title Act and real property concerns.  
His analysis includes one minority opinion that argues for the application of 
the Native Title Act to cultural expressions even though it has historically 
only applied to real property.  Using real property analysis to inform cultural 
property disputes reflects the more holistic worldview of many indigenous 
peoples. 
The authors presented here offer timely insights on the developing 
body of law concerning indigenous rights and implementation of the 
UNDRIP.  These articles, which primarily address control over real and 
intellectual property, raise two fundamental questions:  how should states 
deal with past wrongs and prevent future ones; and, how can indigenous 
peoples effectively advocate for their rights in disputes with states?  
